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SENATOR CARL HATCH AND
THE HATCH ACT OF1939

DAVID PORTER

THE HATCH ACT of

1939, which regulated the political activities of Federal officials, has evoked considerable comment and
controversy. Thirty-three years later, in fact, a Federal Court
questioned the constitutionality of the measure. Surprisingly,
historians have not devoted entire works Of many chapters to the
original Hatch Act/ They have viewed the Act as a political
struggle between Conservatives and President Roosevelt, but have
devoted relatively little attention· to the sponsor of the proposal. 2
Reform Democratic Senator Carl Hatch of New Mexico played
a paramount role in promoting and securing approval of one of
the first legislative efforts to control modem government
bureaucracy.
Hatch carne from a moderate socia-economic background. The
son of a country hardware merchant, Hatch was born in Kirwin,
Kansas, in November 1889, and attended public schools there and
in Eldorado, Oklahoma. In order to earn money to further his education, he served as a clerk in his father's hardware store. He
received a law degree in 1912 from Cumberland University and
returned to Oklahoma to open a law office. Upon visiting Clovis,
New Mexico, as an attorney for some Oklahoma clients, Hatch
liked the area. so much that he decided to settle there. He soon
became a successful attorney, with a practice encompassing a substantial portion of eastern New Mexico. s
Hatch exhibited political aspirations at an early age, but did not
receive considerable publicity. Between World War I and 1933
he held successive posts as Assistant Attorney General of New
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Mexico, collector of internal revenue, Federal judge, and member
of the State Board of Examiners. An humble and frequently shy
individual, Hatch proved a diligent lawyer and judge and drove
himself relentlessly. Defying the image of a typical politician, he
tended to avoid back-room politics and clandestine meetings. He
lacked popularity. in political circles; he consistently injected moral
standards into government service: Although he joined the United
States Senate in October 1933, he remained in the shadow of other
New Mexico politicians. Fellow Democratic Senator Bronson
Cutting frequently stole the limelight by taking credit at the last
moment for legislation that Hatch diligently had initiated. Cutting's successor, Dennis Chavez, also attracted more attention than
Hatch because of his aggressive personality, and as the only
Spanish-American in the upper chamber. Meanwhile, Hatch
quietly pursued his role as a Senator, specializing in western and
judicial problems. An avid political student, he occupied a place on
the Judiciary Committee and in particular supported an investigation of the Works Progress Administration. 4
The WPA, established in 1935, functioned as the largest relief
program of the Roosevelt administration and shifted the responsibility for relief to the state and local governments. For six years it
employed at various intervals practically· one-fifth of the total
American labor force. WPA workers engaged primarily in construction projects, but also performed community serVice projects.
Although averaging 2.1 million workers monthly, because of a
recession the WPA relief rolls expanded to 3.3 million workers
shortly before the 1938 Congressional elections. 5
By 1939 New Deal.critics were making sharp attacks on the
WPA program. Conservative Democrats, along with Republicans,
already· had denounced Roosevelt's performance, including the
President's attempt in 1937 to expand the Supreme Court membership, and, a year later, to purge anti-New Dealers in the primaries. They also had criticized decisions of the National Labor
Board, which ardently defended unionism. After the 1938 elections, additional controversy arose over charges by conservatives
that the Democrats were utilizing the WPA relief agency for
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political advantage. Hatch, who had advocated most New Deal.
programs, also began questioning the political activities of the
WPA and agreed to serve with four other Senators on a committee to investigate charges that local politicians were using the
agency's staff and funds during congressional and senatorial cam.
paigns in 1938.
The Senate Campaign Expenditures Committee, headed by
Democrat Morris Sheppard of Texas, found irregular political activity by the WPA in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania.
In a startling report, they disclosed that WPA finances designed
for needy and distressed persons had been diverted for political
purposes. In the Kentucky primary, WPA employees had contributed $24,000 to the campaign of. Senator Alben Barkley.
Democratic officials had solicited these funds directly, with WPA
employees being canvassed to ascertain their party affiliations. In
neighboring Tennessee, Senator Thomas Stewart had received
substantial donations from Federal civil service and relief employees, supposedly under "intimidation" and "coercion." Pennsylvania Democrats also had solicited funds illegally by mailing
letters bearing the name of Senator Joseph Guffey. WPA officials
not only ordered workers to change their registrations from Republican to· Democratic· or face the loss of their jobs, but sold
tickets at political gatherings to WPA personne1. 6
After the Sheppard Committee investigation; Hatch launched
an intensive personal campaign to strike at political corruption.
An idealist, he drafted legislation to prohibit the intimidation of
voters and thus prevent a recurrence of the 1938 WPA activities.
In particular, the 1938 New Mexico incident,. which Time
described as "the hottest WPA scandal of the year,"· had
prompted Hatch to seek political reform. In October 1938 an
Albuquerque Grand Jury had indicted 73 WPA employees for
engaging in unethical political activities. Although only five
agency persons were ultimately convicted, the conscientious
Hatch seized· the opportunity to launder the dirty linen of New
Mexico politics. He drafted a bill to prevent assessment or solicitation of funds from those receiving relief ·benefits and to prohibit
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denial of WPA assistance because of political affiliations. The
Senator's emphasis on this portion of the bill created the impression that the measure was designed almost exclusively to prevent
the exploitation of relief workers in political campaigns.7
Hatch attached another major provision, which received surprisingly little attention at first. The Senator proposed preventing
Federal officials from using their positions to interfere in Presidential or Congressional elections, thus hoping to decrease the influence of the rival Clyde Tingley-Dennis Chavez Democratic faction upon New Mexico politics. Besides resenting the enormous
publicity received by the Tingley-Chavez organization in the mass
media, Hatch particularly denounced their WPA political activ7
ity in the 1938 Congressional campaign. Fred Healy, former
WPA state administrator and close friend of Tingley, and the
son-in-law, sister, cousin, nephew, and secretary of Senator
Chavez were accused in 1938 of political malpractice with regard to relief workers. Hatch, who apparently avoided involvement in the New Mexico incident, desired legislation to limit the
control by Federal officeholders or factions over state politics. With
this provision, though, the Senator would increase the potential
influence of local bosses, rural legislators, and labor unions over
state political parties and merely exchange one type of rule for
another. s
Before introducing the measure, Hatch consulted briefly with
Senator Sheppard. Hatch had drafted a statement describing the
proposed legislation and, to give it greater political clout, asked
permission to add Sheppard's name to it. The Texas Democrat not
only had chaired the WPA committee investigating, but carried
considerable authority as the fourth member in seniority of the
upper chamber and as head of the increasingly prominent Military
Affairs Committee. Sheppard, who had not read the Hatch bill in
its entirety, apparently assumed that it merely sought to prevent
political coercion of WPA relief workers and agreed to endorse a
statement supporting the legislation. At this point, he did not
realize that the bill also prevented all minor executive employees
from participating in Presidential or Congressional elections. 9
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The Hatch proposal, in fact, encountered scant OppOSItIOn
initially. Roosevelt Administration officials and Senators, like
Sheppard, considered it an attempt to eliminate political corruption. Roosevelt, for example, had advocated improving WPA
election procedures even before Hatch had drafted the comprehensive bill. In appealing for additional WPA funds in January, .
Roosevelt had urged that Congress impose "rigid statutory regulations and penalties" to eliminate "improper political practices" and
recommended punishing violators within and outside the WPA.
Few Administration officials or United States Senators had read
the entire proposed legislation, and hardly noticed the section restricting the political activities of numerous Federal employees. In
fact, Senators raised so few objections that the upper chamber
held very limited debate and on April 13 unanimously approved
the Hatch proposal. lO
Shortly after the Senate action, the Roosevelt administration
began to suspect the real intentions of the measure. They finally
recognized that the bill not only attempted to remove political corruption within the WPA, but also contained broader political
ramifications. Charles Michelson, Publicity Director for the New
Deal programs, advised Presidential Assistant Stephen Early' on
April 17 that conservatives intended to use the Hatch bill "to hit
the President himself." Michelson warned that the section prohibiting political activity by Federal workers could be applied to
Roosevelt, cabinet officials, and members of Congress, and he
urged the administration to examine the measure 'very carefully
before taking any final action. The White House soon alerted
Democratic Representative Emmanuel Celler of New York, who
promptly induced his Judiciary Committee colleagues to pigeonhole the proposal for several weeks. l l
Hatch naturally disliked these latest developments. The New
Mexico Democrat conferred with President Roosevelt on May 3 I ,
urging the chief executive to intervene in expediting House Judiciary Committee action on the bill. But Roosevelt, exhibiting inc
creased anxiety, preferred that Hatch rewrite the section prohibiting all Federal officials from participating in political campaigns.
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Above all, Roosevelt insisted that the measure not apply to himself, cabinet members, Senators or Representatives. During early
June Hatch did not acquiesce to the President's requests because
he considered rewriting unnecessary. In 'drafting the bill, Hatch
had stressed that he was merely extending to other Federal workers the restrictions already applicable to civil service personnel. To
refute claims that the bill contained "absurdities" and "monstrosities," he insisted that an 187 I act had prohibited civil service
workers from engaging in political practices, and he added that
"this language has been tested for more than fifty years." In a
phone call to the President and in a letter to the White House in
mid-June, Hatch gave assurances that the measure would not be .
applied to Roosevelt, his cabinet, or Congress, and would merely
outlaw the political activity by "administrative and supervisory
employees of any Federal agency." Hatch's verbal pledges failed
to allay the President's fears. Roosevelt insisted that this understanding be mentioned explicitly in the bill. A temporary deadlock
developed when Roosevelt still refused to intercede and the House
Judiciary Committee still pigeonholed the bill. 12
Hatch pursued new tactics which prodded the House Judiciary
Committee into considering his measure. While the Senate was
debating legislation to finance relief agencies, Hatch, on June 22,
threatened to attach his bill as an amendment. Although hoping
that such action would "not be necessary," the New Mexico
Democrat saw no other alternative in order to break the impasse
in the House Judiciary Committee. The House Committee finally
reported the bill in late June, but to Hatch's dismay, allowed
District Attorneys, tax collectors, and other. unspecified Feder~l
officials to serve as campaign managers for any candidate. Visibly
disturbed, Hatch immediately protested that the committee
amendment had virtually "emasculated" his bilp3
The committee's action, coupled with Roosevelt's criticisms,
eventually forced Hatch into a more flexible position. In early
July Hatch redrafted his measure so as to exempt "policy-making
officials and ,employees" from provisions of the bill and thus to
enable the President, his cabinet, and members of Congress to
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continue to participate in political activities. Hatch. intended to
have his revision offered as an amendment on the House Roor, and
hoped that the alterations would make the bill "perfectly clear
and de£nite" so that it would capture unequivocal endorsement
from the President. 14
To enhance the prospect for these changes, Hatch again appealed directly to the President in early July. The New Mexico
Democrat preferred to discuss his measure personally with Roosevelt, but the President was preoccupied with monetary and
neutrality legislation. 15 Hatch therefore wrote to Roosevelt on
July 8, making the following fervent appeal: 16
Knowing your· record of opposition to 'bossism' and machine con~
trol of party politics, and believing these reforms to be in keeping
with the principles of our party, I have hoped that your influence
could be thrown. behind the bill in its entirety, and that you and our
party might have credit for a very substantial improvement of party
and political affairs. I shall continue to hope that this may be accomplished at this session.

But Hatch's latest overtures also failed.
During July several Democratic Representatives offered more
vocal resistance to the Hatch bill than before. Celler of New
York led the opposition, assisted by John Coffee of Washington
and a few other New Dealers. Republicans and conservative
Democrats, they protested, designed the measure. to retaliate
against President Roosevelt for attempting to enlarge the Supreme
Court and for seeking to 'purge anti-New Deal Senators. Coffee
of Washington denounced the "intrigue and machinations of the
[Vice-President John] Garner group," while Kent Keller of Illinois
charged that supporters of "the Hatchet bill" were motivated by
"hatred and fear of one Frank Roosevelt." Some New Dealers also
feared that the legislation would weaken the Democratic Party
structure by restricting the rights of members to attend political
functions and by discouraging campaign contributions. Congressman Frank Hook of Michigan asserted that the measure would
lead to CIa lack of interest in government," and· Representative.
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Richard Duncan of Missouri expected "constant charges of activities by our political enemies for the sole purpose of discrediting
those occupying political jobs. "17
The Celler forces also attacked the bill as unconstitutional and
as a violation of civil liberties. Limiting the right of administrative
or supervisory Federal officials to express their opinions on political
subjects, they contended, violated the right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Opponents also warned that
denying Federal officials the right to engage in political activity
deprived them of the prerogatives and advantages of full citizenship and violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Congressman Frank Buck of California, for example, protested
that the measure "goes far beyond what Congress should enact in
the way of limiting free speech and the inherent rights of the
American citizen's political activity." The Celler forces, in addition, criticized the measure as an undemocratic step contravening
American traditions. Assistant Democratic whip Lex Green of
Florida asserted "this bill is conceived of everything which is
inimical to democratic success and democratic government," while
colleague James O'Connor of Montana denounced the legislation
as "Un-American."ls
Opponents also claimed that Congress should not interfere in
state politics and insisted that the measure contained weak enforcement provisions. Several New Dealers suspected that Hatch
had drafted it merely to purify the New Mexico political structure and denied that the Senate or House should intervene to
settle state disputes. "I can see no reasons," Representative Charles
Faddis of Pennsylvania interjected, "why the Congress should
have been required to wash the dirty linen of the New Mexico
political set-up." Congressman Guy Moser, also of Pennsylvania,
charged that the sponsor "spawned and hatched the iniquitous
pernicious political activity bill" after Senator Chavez had "the
disclosure of his nepotism revealed to the nation with the indictment of his family circle." In addition, critics doubted that the
Hatch bill could be enforced uniformly. "The head of a Department is supposed to dismiss an underling for political activity,"
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Celler of New York remarked, but observed ''There is no penalty
if he does not."19 New Dealers had unleashed some formidable
ammunition, but gained relatively little headway in the lower
chamber.
.Despite the resistance by the Administration and New Dealers,
the House of Representatives still rallied to Hatch's defense. Conservative Democrats, along with Republicans, even added further
restrictions, attaching amendments prohibiting executive employees from interfering with or affecting the results of Presidential primaries and elections and also refusing to exempt the President, cabinet officials, Senators, or Representatives from the provisions of the bill. To Hatch's delight, the House on JulY20 resoundingly approved (242-133) the comprehensive measure. 20
Hatch hoped to avoid a Senate floor fight on the amendments.
In an emotional floor speech on July 21, he called up the bill for
Senate concurrence and moved for its adoption. Complaining that
his proposal was the target of ~'many unwarranted, unfair, unjust
and unreasonable criticisms," Hatch insisted that the House action
"if anything, has made it better legislation." Staring directly at
New Deal Democrats Sherman Minton of Indiana and Guffey
of Pennsylvania, Hatch charged that "Some people are trying to
kill this measure by sending it to conference" and particularly denounced their "maneuvers" on the Senate floor. Putting the bill in
conference, Hatch warned, meant "a vote to send it to the graveyard." With enormous zeal, he advised "Let there be no hiding
behind pious declarations that we favor the bill and then send it
to conference to die." Hatch's speech apparently made a profound
impa~t because Minton soon asked the New Dealers to accept the
bill. Thus, the Senate on July 21 consented "without opposition"
to the House amendments. 21
Roosevelt faced a major dilemma regarding the Hatch measure
-to sign or not to sign. Although he favored political reform, the
President disliked some aspects of the Congressional version of
the bill. He easily could have vetoed the legislation and risked
stimulating further charges from conservatives that the administration was making political use of relief. At least fourteen Sen-
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ators and Representatives personally wrote letters or sent telegrams
to the President urging him to veto the Hatch bill. Congressman
Keller of Illinois requested that Roosevelt reject "this outrageous
measure," while Representative William Nelson of Missouri remarked: "It is the hope of many of us who did our best to defeat
the Hatch-Dempsey bill that you will veto this vicious measure."
Celler of New York, along. with several other New Dealers, canvassed the House members and contended that "a veto of the
Hatch Bill would be sustained beyond question."22
At the last minute Hatch persuaded Roosevelt to sign the bill.
In a letter to the President dated July 28, the New Mexico Democrat gave assurance that his measure would not restrict any Federal
employees from engaging in voluntary political activities except
campaign speeches. According to Hatch, Federal employees still
could attend Jackson Day Dinners and make voluntary political
contributions. He also reiterated the nonrevolutionary nature of
the bill, claiming that Congress intended "to make exactly the
same rules which now apply to employees under the classified
service applicable to those in the non-classified service."23
As a result of these assurances, the President on August 2
signed the political reform bill. Far from overjoyed, he approved
the measure with the understanding that Federal employees still
could attend political meetings and make unsolicited political contributions. Besides affirming the constitutionality of the legislation,
he also considered the Hatch Act "a step in the right direction"
toward establishing "decency in political campaigns." Nevertheless, he warned that major judges should not make the measure
"a gag act." Hatch, fearful that the President would veto the bill,
praised Roosevelt's actions and immediately telegraphed "THANK
YOU!"24

The 1939 Act was the crowning achievement of Hatch's political career. Hatch undoubtedly played the most prominent role in
securing Congressional regulation of political activity of Federal
employees. Desiring to reform the WPA relief program and to
lessen the influence of the Tingley-Chavez organization, he
eagerly participated in the Senate Campaign Expenditures Com-
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mittee investigations and helped to write a comprehensive measure
to regulate political practices of Federal workers. He actively
sought Presidential intervention when the House Judiciary Committee pigeonholed the measure and altered the bill in an attempt
to correct.various weaknesses. Hatch's floor speech iIi late July
averted the possibility of a conference committee·deadlock, while
his subsequent understanding with the President prevented a
likely veto. Above all, Hatch had initiated one of the first major
attempts to regulate modern federal government.
During the next year, Hatch expanded the scope of his legislation. The Hatch Act of 1939 restricted only the political practices
of Federal workers, but state and local government employees still
could participate actively in Federal elections. State and municipal
officials, who far outnumbered. Federal personnel, theoretically
could still influence or coerce the voting behavior of WPA
workers. Therefore Hatch proposed applying the act to state and
local government officials and preventing individuals or groups
from contributing over $5,000 to any political party or candidate
in Federal elections. Since 1940 was a· Presidential election year,
Hatch's. measure provoked extensive debate in Congress. But
Hatch triumphed again by late summer and significantly increased the impact of the original measure.
':',
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